This paper explores the interface between principles of self-applicable truth and classical logic. To this end, the proof-theoretic strength of a number of axiomatic theories of truth over intuitionistic logic is determined. The theories considered correspond to the maximal consistent collections of fifteen truththeoretic principles as isolated in Leigh and Rathjen 2012.
Introduction
In the analysis of the truth-theoretic paradoxes it is often the underlying logic that receives the blame. It is well known that in a purely classical environment, compositionality and self-reference do not mix well, so weaker logics have been suggested for the truth predicate. These are typically either partial or paraconsistent logics (for example [8, 11] ). Compared with classical logic however, such logics are not well understood and, as Feferman famously remarks, "nothing like sustained ordinary reasoning can be carried on in [them] " [7, p. 95] . This paper explores the interface between principles of self-applicable truth and classical logic more deeply, in particular the rôle classical principles play in restricting the free use of the truth predicate. To this end, we analyse various axiomatisations of truth over intuitionistic logic.
Intuitionistic logic has not received much attention to date from the truth theory community, but it does possess a number of virtues. As a logic upon which to study the effect of classical reasoning, it is better suited than other weakenings of classical logic because of its mature model theory and proof theory. This means that consistency and conservativeness results for truth over intuitionistic logic can be easily interpreted outside the field of theories of truth (for example in set theory or second order analysis) as they can with classical logic. It also provides a firm base over which to study constructive interpretations of truth either in their own right or as approximations to classical truth.
We consider theories of truth that arise from expanding Heyting arithmetic by a fresh predicate symbol T and axioms regarding T taken from a collection of fifteen principles (these are listed in table 1 below). The principles under consideration extend the twelve "Optional Axioms" isolated by Friedman and Sheard [9] and include various weakenings of the faulty truth bi-conditional A ↔ T A , axioms describing the compositional and self-applicable nature of truth and principles stating that the truth predicate has necessarily a complete or consistent interpretation. In [9] , Friedman and Sheard showed that the twelve Optional Axioms give rise to nine maximal consistent theories of truth. Subsequent work by Cantini [6] , Halbach [10] and Leigh and Rathjen [14] establish the proof-theoretic strength of each of the nine theories proving they range from conservative extensions of Peano arithmetic to the strength of one inductive definition, ID 1 .
In [15] the same principles of truth are analysed over intuitionistic logic. It is observed that there are natural principles that, although equivalent over the classical base theory utilised in [9] and [14] , can be separated over a purely intuitionistic base theory. As such, it is shown that some of the inconsistencies noted in [9] can be attributed to classical principles inherent in the base theory, the law of excluded middle or the statement that the logic under the truth predicate is classical, and that these sets of principles are consistent over the intuitionistic base theory. For instance, if the logic under the truth predicate is classical, the principles T A ∨ B → T A ∨ T B and T A ∨ T ¬A (stated for arbitrary sentences A, B) are equivalent. Nevertheless, there are models of the intuitionistic base theory that satisfy the former but refute the latter principle. In fact, the former axiom is consistent with all consistent sets of truth principles, while the latter is inconsistent with roughly half. The upshot is that while there are still exactly nine maximal consistent sets of principles over the new base theory, reverting to intuitionistic logic provides more freedom to express principles of truth while avoiding the pitfalls of inconsistency.
In this paper we analyse the nine maximal consistent theories of truth isolated in [15] and determine their proof-theoretic strength. The theories we analyse separate into two categories. Theories in the first group comprise all the compositional axioms for the logical symbols and so possess truth predicates that formalise satisfaction in certain classical or intuitionistic models. What distinguishes them from each other is the manner in which this self-reference appears. This ranges from trivial instances of self-reference to finitely iterated truth akin to theories of ramified truth. The second group consists of those theories not containing the compositional axiom for implication. Instead there is a greater freedom to state self-referential axioms, in particular the axiom T Tẋ → Tx and the rule of inference "from T A infer A". As a result in these theories the truth predicate formalises a notion of idealised provability and intuitionistic truth.
Preliminaries
Let HA and PA be, respectively, the theories of Heyting and Peano arithmetic formulated in the language L. We denote by L T , the language L extended to include a unary predicate T. HA T is HA formulated in L T , that is with the schema of induction extended to formulae of L T , likewise PA T . Formulae of L are called arithmetical.
We fix a primitive recursive coding . of L T into the natural numbers along with suitable primitive recursive functions ∧ . , ∨ . , and → . so that A • . B = A • B for all formulae A and B with • ∈ {∧, ∨, →}, and m • . n = 0 =0 if either x or y is not the code of a formula. Also present is a function sub(m, n) such that sub(m, n) = A(n) if m = A(x) where A has at most x free, and sub(m, n) = 0 =0 otherwise. Sent LT x and Prov S x are formulae expressing, respectively, that x is the code of a sentence in L T , and x is the code of a formula provable in the theory S. We also make use of the usual abbreviations in this context including: ∀ A B( A ) for ∀z(Sent LT z → Bz) and ∀ A(x) B( A ) for ∀z(Sent LT sub(z,0) → Bz) where z is some fresh variable symbol, and similarly for existential quantification; and A(ẏ) to abbreviate the term sub( A(x) , y). sent denotes the set of all codes of L T formulae.
We fix a suitably large notation system for ordinals. We use Greek letters α, β etc. to range over ordinals in this system and, to reduce notation, the same symbols will also represent formal variables ranging over their arithmetical codes. Moreover, < will be used for the induced less-than relation (assumed to be primitive recursive) on the notation system as well as the standard ordering on the natural numbers. Context should dictate which reading is appropriate.
For a formula A(x), TI(A, x) denotes the axiom of transfinite induction on A up to (the ordinal encoded as) x, in symbols
where Prog A is the formula expressing that A is progressive in x,
For a language L 0 and ordinal α, TI L0 (<α) denotes the schema of transfinite induction on initial segments of α for L 0 , that is the collection of formulae TI(A,m) where A is from L 0 and m encodes an ordinal β < α.
Let S and T be theories formulated in either L or L T . Then S and T are said to be proof-theoretically equivalent if they prove the same theorems of L and, moreover, that this fact can be established within HA. If, moreover, S is formulated in L and T in L T , we call T a conservative extension of S. The proof-theoretic ordinal of a theory is defined to be the smallest ordinal α (from our fixed notation system) such that the theory is proof-theoretically equivalent to (or a conservative extension of) either HA + TI L (<α) or PA + TI L (<α). As we will be only concerned with determining the proof-theoretic ordinal of (what turn out to be) consistent, predicatively reducible theories formulated in L T , it suffices to pick a notation system for Γ 0 .
We make extensive use of models of intuitionistic logic, in particular intuitionistic Kripke ω-structures for L T , which are introduced below. N denotes the standard (classical) model of arithmetic.
, and the following persistency requirement is satisfied: whenever
We write T u for the set {x : u, x ∈ T M }. W M is referred to as the carrier of M, w ∈ W M as a world of M, and T w as the interpretation of truth at w.
A Kripke ω-structure determines a satisfaction relation, u A for u ∈ W M and sentences A in L T , defined as follows.
1. w ⊥ does not hold for any w ∈ W M , 2. w R(t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ) iff R(t 0 , . . . , t n−1 ) is true in N, where R is an n-ary predicate symbol in L for a primitive recursive relation and t 0 , . . . , t n−1 are closed terms of L, 3. w T(s) iff s N ∈ T w , 4. w A ∧ B iff w A and w B, 5. w A ∨ B iff either w A or w B, 6. w A → B iff for every u ≥ w u A implies u B, 7. w ∃xA(x) iff there is an n ∈ N such that w A(n), 8. w ∀xA(x) iff for every u ≥ w and every n ∈ N, u A(n).
We may write M to emphasise the relation is defined with respect to M or drop the subscript M from W M and T M when M is clear from the context. If M is an intuitionistic Kripke ω-structure and A is a sentence of
An intuitionistic Kripke ω-structure M = W M , ≤ M , T M is a classical (ω-)model if its universe has at most one element, i.e. |W M | = 1. In that case M is determined by T w where w ∈ W M and T M = {w} × T w , and we shall write M = N, T w .
Principles of truth Definition 2. Let Base i
T denote the theory extending HA T by the additional axioms:
where val i (x) expresses that x is the Gödel number of an intuitionistically valid first-order L T -formula and Ax PRA (x) expresses that x is the Gödel number of a non-logical axiom of primitive recursive arithmetic. Base T is the theory Base i T formulated in classical logic plus the principle ∀ A T( A ∨ ¬A ) stating that the underlying logic of the predicate T is classical. Table 1 shows the principles of truth considered in [9] and [15] . These principles are to be read as shorthand for their more general formulation: for example, the principle In is presented as the axiom schema A → TA but should, in full generality, be given as
for each formula A with at most x 0 , . . . , x n free. Likewise, Rep and ∀-Inf should be read as, respectively,
1 It is possible to assume that quantification in some of the axioms is not restricted to range over only codes of L T sentences. For instance, Rep could just as well be formulated as ∀x(Tx → T( Tẋ )). Problems begin to arise in the unrelativised version of Comp and Comp(w) in connection with the coding function → . (see, for example [15] ). In this case care will be needed to avoid trivial inconsistencies. Finally, the rules of inference are assumed to be in parametrised form, so Intro is the rule "from A(x 0 , . . . , x n ) infer T( A(ẋ 0 , . . . ,ẋ n ) )" for formulae A with at most x 0 , . . . , x n free.
Theories of truth
The following theorem, due to Friedman and Sheard [9] sets the scene for classical theories of truth. Since Comp(w), ∨-Inf and →-Inf are all equivalent to Comp [15, Proposition 3.3] over Base T , these can be safely omitted. Theories D and H have been studied for their proof-theoretic content by Halbach [10] and Cantini [6] respectively. The remaining seven theories were analysed by Leigh and Rathjen [14] .
Definition 3. ACA 0 is the classical second-order theory of arithmetical comprehension with the set induction axiom; ACA extends ACA 0 by the schema of induction for all second-order formulae; ACA
Proof. As an axiom of Base i T we have that the truth predicate distributes over implication. Therefore,
where PRA i denotes the first order theory formulated in intuitionistic logic whose axioms are those of primitive recursive arithmetic. All that remains to prove proposition 1 is to show the axiom of induction is proved uniformly true in S i 0 ; that is, to show
This is no different from the classical setting and is established by first employing induction to obtain
whence ∀-Inf plus propositional logic (under the truth predicate) entails (2).
It immediately follows that the formalised consistency statement for HA, Con HA , is derivable in S Let GRP S abbreviate the formula ∀ A (Prov S ( A ) → T A ), and Refl S the schema ∀x(Prov S ( A(ẋ) ) → A(x)), for each formula A with at most x free. Combining propositions 1 and 2 we deduce:
Since CT i derives the schema of transfinite induction up to 0 for every formula of L T , lemma 1 entails that both B i and C i have proof-theoretic ordinal at least 0 . As each theory is a sub-theory of its classical cousin, this bound must be optimal. Whereas the arithmetical part of CT i remains a non-classical theory, proposition 2 implies that CT i + Comp comprises PA. Thus, in fact B i and C i are both proof-theoretically equivalent to PA + TI(< 0 ).
Theorem 4
The theories B i and C i have the same arithmetical theorems as ACA.
Before turning our attention to the other maximal consistent sets, we note the following.
Proposition 3 CT
i + TI LT (< α) has the same arithmetical consequences as HA + TI L (< α ).
The theory G i
We now turn our attention to G i which is axiomatised by In, Rep, Intro, Elim, ¬Elim, Comp(w), ∨-Inf, →-Inf, ∀-Inf and ∃-Inf. The classical formulation of this theory, G, axiomatised as Base T + Rep + ∀-Inf + Intro + Elim + ¬Elim, is proof-theoretically equivalent to ACA + 0 and hence also D. This analysis was given in [14] and involves embedding G into an infinitary sequent calculus for truth. While this technique can (and will) be adapted to study the intuitionistic theories E i , F i and I i , it does not work in the case of G i . This has less to do with the presence of In, rather it is the axiom →-Inf that forces an alternative approach which requires the interpretation of truth to be closed under a form of deduction rule. The problem is explored more deeply in [15, §5.3] .
We recall the model construction for G i in [15] . For each m < ω, define an intuitionistic ω-Kripke model G m such that G m has m + 1 worlds ordered by m < Gm m − 1 < Gm · · · < Gm 0, the interpretation of truth at world 0 is given by T 0 = sent, and at world n + 1 ≤ m by Let ACA i+ 0 be the intuitionistic second order theory extending intuitionistic ACA 0 by the axiom expressing that the ω-jump of every set exist; that is,
Here Y (x) := {y : x, y ∈ Y } and j(X) denotes the Turing jump of the set X.
The definition of the set T m+1 is recursive in the ω-jump of the set T m (see for example [13 In the next section we deal with the proof-theoretic strength of the remaining theories. A corollary of that work, particularly lemma 2, is an optimal lower bound on the strength of G i .
Corollary 1
The theories G i and ACA i+ 0 have the same arithmetical consequences.
Truth as provability
The remaining theories of truth each contain S i 1 as a proper sub-theory. Sheard [16] observes that S 1 proves the schema of transfinite induction for initial segments of φ20, where φ denotes the two-placed Veblen function on ordinals. The intuitionistic case is analogous and sketched below; since no classical principles are required in Sheard's proof we may deduce S i 1 TI LT (<φ20). The converse also holds, namely that every arithmetical theorem of S i 1 is derivable in HA + TI L (<φ20), and is a consequence of theorem 5.
Let I(x) denote the formula ∀ A(x) T( TI(A,ẋ) ) and J(x) denote the formula I( x ).
Proof. For every formula A with x free we can construct a formula A primitive recursive in A such that
By proposition 1 and the axioms of Base i T we therefore have
Similarly, utilising the progressiveness of TI(A, x) for each A, which is provable in HA, we obtain S i 0
Prog I. Combining this with (3) yields Prog J.
Lemma 2 S i 1
TI(A,ᾱ) for every formula A and ordinal α < φ20.
TI(A, ᾱ ) for every formula A by an application of Elim. But φ20 is, by definition, the least non-zero ordinal closed under the function α → α , so we are done. The proof is essentially identical to [14, Lemma 2.44] and so we omit it.
Sequent calculi for intuitionistic theories of truth
Upper bounds for the remaining theories, except H i , are obtained by means of ordinal analysis. For each theory we define an infinitary sequent calculus into which the sub-theory without the truth elimination rules Elim or ¬Elim, embeds. Then, by means of cut elimination and a formalisation of the modeltheoretic consistency proof, it is shown that the elimination rules are admissible. The precise ordinal bound required in the admissibility of the rules yields an upper bound on the proof-theoretic strength of the theory in question. In this section we introduce the notation and definitions common to each system.
In the following all L T formulae and terms are assumed closed unless otherwise stated. The rank of an L T -formula, |A|, is defined by recursion on the complexity of A:
• |s = t| = |⊥| = |Ts| = 0;
• |A • B| = max{|A|, |B|} + 1 for • ∈ {∧, ∨, →};
We now define four Gentzen-style sequent calculi for truth, denoted T ⇒, I ⇒, E ⇒ and F ⇒. Each calculus comprises all the basic axioms and rules listed in table 2, as well as a selection of the truth rules. Derivations in T ⇒ involve only the basic axioms and rules and the rule (Intro). The other calculi are defined according to the principles present in the corresponding finite theory. For instance, the rule (TL) corresponds to the axiom (Del) and (→ T R) to the axiom Comp(w), so these are both present in the definition of F ⇒ and I ⇒. Explicitly, E ⇒ comprises all the rules apart from (TR), (→ T R) and Intro T ; F ⇒ comprises the axioms and rules of E ⇒ but with (→ T R) replacing (Cons); and I ⇒ consists of all the truth rules excluding (Intro) and (Cons). Notice that (→ T R) is not the dual of (→ T L) but rather a weakened form corresponding to the axiom Comp(w). The full dual of (→ T L) corresponds to the axiom →-Inf which does not occur in the theories. The calculus T ⇒ represents the theory HA T + Intro which is used as an interpretation of the truth predicate for H i and I i .
Associated to derivations of sequents we have the usual measure of ordinal height. For calculi with the rule (Intro) we introduce a further measure, rank, which denotes the order-type of occurrences of this rule in a derivation. We write Γ ⇒ α A (or Γ ⇒ β α A where applicable) to denote that the sequent Γ ⇒ A is derivable with height α (and rank β). In order to improve readability in the presentation of the truth rules we have assumed B denotes any closed term s whose denotation in the standard model is the Gödel code of B. Thus, for example, if r and t are closed terms such that r N is the code of an L T formula and either
is an instance of (∧ T L). By the standard arguments, the full cut rule is admissible in each calculus, so each of the finite theories E i , F i and I i is embeddable in the corresponding infinitary system for deductions not involving the rules Elim and ¬Elim. The aim of this section is to establish the admissibility of the elimination rules in the calculi E ⇒, F ⇒, I ⇒ and T ⇒. Let ω 0 (α) = α and ω n+1 (α) = ω ωn(α) . Basic rules
Basic axioms
Γ, Ai ⇒ A ∧L (i < 2) Γ, A0 ∧ A1 ⇒ A Γ, A0 ⇒ A Γ, A1 ⇒ A ∨L Γ, A0 ∨ A1 ⇒ A Γ, A(s) ⇒ B ωL Γ, ∀xA(x) ⇒ B Γ ⇒ A0 Γ ⇒ A1 ∧R Γ ⇒ A0 ∧ A1 Γ ⇒ Ai ∨R (i < 2) Γ ⇒ A0 ∨ A1 {Γ ⇒ A(m) | m < ω} ωR Γ ⇒ ∀xA(x) Γ ⇒ A Γ, B ⇒ C →L Γ, A → B ⇒ C {Γ, A(m) ⇒ B | m < ω} ∃L Γ, ∃xA(x) ⇒ B Γ, A ⇒ B →R Γ ⇒ A → B Γ ⇒ A(s) ∃R Γ ⇒ ∃xA(x)
Truth rules
Cons. Γ, T ⊥ ⇒ A for any Γ, A. Proposition 6 Let ⇒ denote one of T ⇒, E ⇒, F ⇒ or I ⇒. Then the following holds.
1.
If Γ ⇒ A is derivable with height α, s N = t N and (Γ * , A * ) is obtained from (Γ, A) by replacing some occurrences of the term s by t, then the sequent Γ * ⇒ A * is also derivable with height α. 2. If the sequent Γ ⇒ Ts is derivable and s N ∈ sent, then for any formula A there is a derivation of the same height of Γ ⇒ A. 3. If the sequents Γ ⇒ A and Γ, A ⇒ B are both derivable with height α, the sequent Γ ⇒ B is derivable with height ω α n for some n.
The analysis of H i has a somewhat different flavour. Instead of embedding H i into an infinitary proof system, the theory will be directly interpreted in the theory of Kripke-Platek set theory over the natural numbers. The interpretation of the truth predicate in this embedding will be derivability in the theory HA T + Intro expanded with the ω-rule which is formalised by the calculus T ⇒. This is taken up in section 4.
The theory
i is a consistent theory. Before proceeding with the proof-theoretic analysis of I i it will be instructive to recap the proof of this result.
Let I be the intuitionistic Kripke model that consists of two worlds 0 < I 1 such that the interpretation of truth at 0 is sent LT and the interpretation of truth at 1 is all codes of formulae B that are derivable in the theory Th ω that extends HA T by the rules Intro and the ω-rule. Since Th ω is closed under Intro, Elim and has both the disjunction and existence properties (lemmata 5.22 and 5.25 in [15] ), we deduce that I is a model of all axioms of I i (note that Comp(w) is satisfied vacuously in I). All that remains is to establish that if I |= T A then in fact I |= A. However, by construction, I is a model of Th ω , and I |= T B holds just in case Th ω B. So I i is consistent. Our approach to establishing the proof theoretic strength of I i is a formalisation of the model construction above. Validity in I will be replaced by formal derivability in the sequent calculus I ⇒. For this to hold we require that the rule Elim is admissible in I ⇒, that is if ∅ I ⇒ Ts is derivable then s N = A for some formula A and ∅ I ⇒ A is derivable. Crucial to isolating the proof-theoretic ordinal is obtaining ordinal bounds on this rule. We shall prove that whenever the former sequent is derivable with height α, the latter is derivable with height
This scenario should be compared with the proof-theoretic analysis of I in [14] where an upper bound is obtained by defining a classical Tait-style sequent calculus I ∞ ∆ into which I without its elimination rules embeds and for which the following soundness result holds.
Lemma 4
If I ∞ ∆ is derivable with height α and ∆ consists of only positive atomic formulae, then some element of ∆ is satisfied in the classical model whose interpretation of the truth predicate is the set of sentences cut-free derivable in the infinitary expansion of the theory PA T + Intro with height bounded by α .
The proof of the above lemma proceeds via transfinite induction on α and requires that if the sequent I ∞ ∆ is derivable, it has a derivation in which all sequents appearing in the derivation contain only formulae positive in the truth predicate. This condition holds because the calculus I ∞ admits cut elimination and does not contain rules that introduce negative occurrences of the truth predicate from purely positive ones. The calculus of I ⇒ does not fulfil this criterion, however. Even if the derivation of ∅ I ⇒ Ts is cut free, any occurrence of the rule (→ T R) or (→ T L) will have a premise in which negative occurrences of the truth predicate appear. Thus a more general result is required that applies to derivations in which the truth predicate can occur on either side of the sequent arrow.
The solution is to make use of asymmetric interpretations for truth. These are formalised models in which positive and negative occurrences of the truth predicate may have different interpretations. In the context of I i this roughly takes the form of an hierarchy of models {I α | α < Γ 0 } based on the model I and a binary function f such that if Γ I ⇒ A is derivable with height α and Γ ∪ {A} consists of atomic formulae only, then for any ordinal γ, I f (α,γ) satisfies A provided I γ satisfies each element of Γ. The use of asymmetric interpretations in the analysis of theories of truth is based on Cantini [5] where they were used for a proof-theoretical study of sub-theories of the Kripke-Feferman theory KF.
Ultimately, we require that the argument to establish closure of the calculus I ⇒ under Elim does not surpass arithmetic, so reference to the model I α must be removed in favour of arithmetically definable notions. This is the idea behind the calculus T ⇒ and the slash relations | 0 and | 1 which we define below.
Definition 5. A sequent Γ T ⇒ A is derivable with height α if there is a derivation of Γ ⇒ A according to the basic rules and axioms listed in table 2 and the rule (Intro). The calculus I ⇒ is defined according to all the axioms and rules laid out in tables 2 except (Intro) and (Cons).
The following lemmata are immediate consequences of the definition of T ⇒.
Lemma 5 If ∅ T ⇒ Ts has a derivation with height α then s N = A for some formula A and ∅ T ⇒ A has a derivation with height α. Moreover, whenever Γ T ⇒ A is derivable, Γ I ⇒ A has a derivation with the same height.
Lemma 6
Let A be an L T formula such that HA T + Intro + Elim A, and let A * be a result of substituting for free variables in A arbitrary closed terms. Then ∅ T ⇒ α A * for some α < 0 .
We now move to the task of proving that if the sequent I ⇒T A is derivable then so is I ⇒A. Specifically, we show the height of the latter derivation is bounded by ω α if α bounds the height of the former one. We define two variants of the Aczel slash relation (c.f. [1] and [18] ) to play the rôle of the informal models I α described above: | α 0 and | α 1 . They apply only to atomic formulae and are defined as follows. The following proposition establishes some basic properties about the two relations.
Proposition 7 Let
A be an atomic formula, α < Γ 0 and i < 2.
We can now state and prove the main theorem of this section. A. Since β < α we are done.
An immediate consequence of theorem 6 is that I ⇒ is closed under both Elim and ¬Elim. From this we can deduce that I can be embedded in I ⇒. i is vacuously closed under ¬Elim, so there is nothing to check in this case.
Theorem 7 I
i proves the same arithmetical statements as HA + TI(<φ20). Moreover, this fact can be verified within HA.
Proof. One direction is given by lemma 2; here we prove the converse. The formalisation of the 3-placed predicate Γ I ⇒ α A and the pertaining lemmata is standard. Theorem 6, however, makes extensive use of the relations | and the principle of transfinite induction. As the two relations apply only to atomic formulae they are both definable within HA T (indeed within IΣ 1 ). Thus it suffices to show that the relevant applications of transfinite induction can be sufficiently bounded. To manage the use of the principle in the proof of theorem 6, observe that given a derivation of I ⇒Ts with height α, applying the theorem to deduce | 
for each β < γ, where Γ HA * ⇒ α A represents the three-placed predicate formalising derivability via the basic rules in table 2 and recursive ω-rules, |A| denotes the number of symbols occurring in A and Γ ∧ denotes the conjunction of all formulae in Γ, with ∅ ∧ = (0 =0). However, I ⇒ does not support full cut elimination so derivations do not in general have the sub-formula property. In particular, within a derivation of
A for an arithmetical formula A there may appear formulae of the form Ts that are subsequently removed via cuts. In order to manage these additional cuts we replace the partial truth predicate Tr m by another truth predicate Tr 
for each -ordinal β < γ, whence indeed HA + TI(< m+1 0 ) A as A is arithmetical. Finally, m+1 0 < φ20 for each m, so we are done.
The theory E i

E
i is axiomatised by Del, ∀-Inf, ∃-Inf, ∨-Inf, Cons, Intro, Elim and ¬Elim. As lemma 3 demonstrates, E i is proof-theoretically stronger than I i . The interplay of Intro, Del and Elim over S 0 provides the increase in proof-theoretic strength; each application of Intro allows for the derivation of new arithmetical theorems. Recall that since E ⇒ is formulated with the rule (Intro), we write Γ ⇒ m α A to denote that the sequent Γ E ⇒ A is derivable with height α and truth rank m. Definition 6. Let Γ E ⇒A be the sequent calculus defined according to the rules of table 2 excluding (→ T R) and (TR).
With proposition 6(iii) we know that the calculus E ⇒ admits the full cut rule. To embed deductions in E i as derivations in E ⇒ we require that the rule Elim is also admissible. To this aim we introduce a fresh slash relation The following observation, which is a consequence of the definition above, is crucial to establish the soundness claim over applications of (∨ T L) and (∃ T L).
Lemma 8 If
β m A and |A| = k, then ∅ E ⇒A is derivable with rank m and height φmβ + k. Theorem 8 (Soundness for E ⇒) Fix n < ω. For every m < n and α < φn0, if Γ E ⇒ A is derivable with rank m and height α, then
Proof. The proof is similar to that of theorem 6 but with an additional induction argument over m < n external to the transfinite induction on α. Suppose Γ E ⇒ A is as in the statement of the theorem, that γ < φmα, and γ+ω α ,γ m Γ holds. We proceed via a case distinction on the last rule applied in the derivation. Despite the fact that has a more complex definition than | and this theorem is not restricted to derivations containing only atomic formulae, many of the cases have arguments that are almost identical to the proof of theorem 6. Thus below we present only a selection of the possible cases. Let δ = γ + ω α .
→L: This case was not relevant in the proof of theorem 6 as it was assumed that Γ consisted of atomic formulae only. Thus suppose Γ contains A 0 → A 1 and that the sequents Γ E ⇒ A 0 and Γ, A 1 E ⇒ A are derivable with height β < α. By the induction hypothesis we may assume
m A, and finally γ,δ m A. The arguments for the other basic rules are essentially identical, so omitted.
Cons: In this case Γ contains Ts for some term s with s N = ⊥ . The definition of therefore implies that the sequent ∅ E ⇒ ⊥ is derivable with rank m < m and height η < φmγ. As η < φn0, the main induction hypothesis is applicable, yielding ∧ holds, the sequent ∅ E ⇒ A 0 , and hence also A 0 , (A 0 → A 1 ) E ⇒ A 1 , is derivable with rank m and height η < φmδ 0 . By an admissible cut (proposition 6) we deduce that the sequent ∅ E ⇒ A 1 is also derivable with height bounded by φmδ 0 and rank m . Thus Corollary 2 If E ⇒Ts is derivable with rank m and height α then s N = A for some formula A, and E ⇒A is derivable with the same rank and with height bounded by φmα.
Having established the admissibility of Elim, all that remains is to embed deductions in E i into derivations in E ⇒.
Lemma 9 Suppose E i
A and that the number of symbols occurring in this derivation is m. Let A * be some closed instantiation of A. Then ∅ E ⇒ A * is derivable with rank m and height bounded by φ(m + 1)0.
Proof. Notice that the rule ¬Intro is derivable in E i from Intro and Cons. The sequent Tm E ⇒Tm is an axiom for every m < ω and, by (Cons), T⊥ . E ⇒⊥ is also an axiom. An application of (→ T L) therefore yields Tm, T(m → . ⊥ . ) E ⇒ 1 ⊥, from which two applications of (→R) and (ωR) give E ⇒ 4 ∀x(T(x → . ⊥ . ) → (Tx → ⊥)).
Since the deduction E i A can contain no more than m applications of Intro, and each application of Elim in the deduction can be mirrored within E ⇒ by passing from α to φmα, it follows that E ⇒A * is derivable with height φ(m + 1)0 and rank m.
Theorem 9 E proves the same arithmetical statements as HA + TI(<φω0). Moreover, this can be verified within HA.
Proof. Following the earlier observations made regarding derivations in I ⇒, we require only to establish that the lemmata pertaining to E ⇒ can be formalised within the language of HA. This fact, however, is not straightforward as unlike with the use of |, it is necessary for the relation to apply to formulae of arbitrary complexity. This new relation behaves, in many respects, as a compositional truth predicate for the language of arithmetic. With this in mind, the formalisation of proposition 8 through to lemma 9 will be made within CT i ϕω0 , a conservative extension of HA + TI(<φω0).
Expanding on earlier conventions, we let Γ E ⇒ m α A denote the four-placed predicate formalising the property that Γ E ⇒ A is derivable with bound α and rank m. While the relation cannot be adequately represented in arithmetic, it can be formulated, and its defining axioms be proven, by utilising the truth predicate within CT 
Notice that we must work in CT i φ(n+1)0 and not an arbitrary CT i α in order to maintain bounds on the transfinite induction required for the cases (∨ T L) and (∃ T L). Fix m < n < p. Following (4) we obtain
and so, since the cut rule is also provably admissible in E ⇒ (proposition 6(iii)), it becomes clear that lemma 9 (stated for m) can be formalised and proven within CT i φp0 . Therefore, if Prov E i (m, x) represents derivability in E i with at most m applications of Intro, we have
Also CT i α x,ȳ m A → A holds whenever A is arithmetical, hence, since the theory HA suffices as a meta-theory for the above argument, we are done. The analysis of F ⇒ employs a combination of arguments from the analysis of I ⇒ and E ⇒. Like E ⇒ and I ⇒, the full cut rule is admissible in F ⇒, with the same ordinal bounds. In analogy to the analysis of I i , we introduce two slash relations, 0 and 1 , with the first of these holding of Ts whenever s N ∈ sent and the second holding if s N is derivable in some fragment of F ⇒ determined via parameters. Due to the lack of a cut elimination theorem for F i , it is required that the two relations are defined for arbitrary L T formulae. As such, they are more closely related to the relation of the previous section. We define A holds for every γ < φmα and each i < 2. The following results are obtained using the same arguments as in the previous section.
The theory
Proposition 9
The following holds for every i < 2, α < Γ 0 , m < ω and atomic formula A. Theorem 10 (Soundness for F ⇒) Fix n < ω. For every m < n and α < φn0, if Γ F ⇒ A is derivable with rank m and height α, then
(i). If
The proof of this theorem is not substantially different from that of theorem 8, so we omit the details. The relation 0 cannot be dispensed with as it is essential in verifying the case that Γ F ⇒ A is obtained from an application of (→ T R). A consequence of the theorem is that ∅ F ⇒A is derivable with bound φ(m + 2)0 and rank m whenever A is a sentence derivable in F i with at most m applications of the rule Intro. Combining this with the argument in theorems 7 and 9 we determine the proof-theoretic strength of F i .
Theorem 11 F i is a conservative extension of HA + TI(<φω0).
The theory H i
The final theory we wish to analyse is H i . Its classical counterpart H was first investigated in [9] and shown to be at least as strong as the theory of one inductive definition, ID 1 . Cantini [6] , studying an extension of H, demonstrated that the two theories are in fact proof-theoretically equivalent. The intuitionistic counterpart of ID 1 , denoted ID Proof. Fix a P-positive formula A(u, P), let Prog A B be the formula ∀u(A(u, B) → B(u)) and denote by I * A (x) the formula ∀z(Sent LT z(0) → (Prog A Tz(ẋ) → Tz(ẋ)).
We claim that H i F * whenever ID Thus every arithmetical theorem of H i is derivable within KPω i .
Prospectus
We finish by describing two possible avenues for future research.
Weak fixed point theories
At first glance it may not seem surprising that the theories A i -I i are prooftheoretically equivalent to their classical counterparts. After all, the only axioms lacking compared to the classical framework is the law of excluded middle. A closer inspection of the model constructions paints a different picture however. To prove the consistency of the theories F i , E i and I i , the truth predicate is interpreted as derivability in a suitably defined ω-logic that satisfies the rule Elim as well as the disjunction and existence properties. Each of these properties is strictly positive in its formulation, taking the form "if X is derivable, then so is Y". Therefore it is natural to suppose that the formalisation of the consistency proof for F i , say, can be carried out in the theory of positive inductive definitions, ID * 1 , the sub-theory of ID 1 in which (Ax.2) and the schema of induction is stated only for formulae B that do not contain negative instances of other fixed point predicates (see [2] for more details regarding ID * 1 ). This is emphasised by the classical proof-theoretic analysis which shows that F is interpretable in ID * 1 . The intuitionistic version of ID * 1 , however, is known to be conservative over Heyting arithmetic, so none of the eight theories B i -I i are interpretable in intuitionistic ID * 1 . Furthermore, since the non-classical axioms Comp(w), ∨-Inf and ∃-Inf do not contribute to the strength of the theories, we obtain the following.
Theorem 15 None of the theories E, F, G or I are relatively interpretable in ID *
.
An interesting problem therefore is to isolate an interpretation of F in ID * 1 . By the previous theorem this cannot result from translating the truth predicate as a fixed formula of ID 1 . We expect, however, that an interpretation could be obtained by employing variants of the asymmetric interpretations utilised in the present paper for classical theories of truth.
Cut elimination
One obvious advantage of the asymmetric interpretations is that the analysis of the calculi E ⇒, F ⇒ and I ⇒ requires only partial cut elimination. In fact, we leave open the question of whether or not cuts on the truth predicate can, in general, be eliminated in these systems and note only that the problem is nontrivial for the systems considered here. For instance, the elimination of the cut Γ, Ts ⇒ A Γ ⇒ Ts Γ ⇒ A requires assigning a measure of complexity to the atomic formula Ts that decreases when the cut is "transferred upwards" through the derivation. In nonself-referential settings one typically picks the logical complexity of the formula with Gödel code s N (or 0 if s N is not the code of a formula). This simple measure of complexity clearly does not work for I ⇒ where the two premises of the cut rule may be derived by applications of (TL) and (TR) respectively. Although the calculi E ⇒ and F ⇒ do not contain (TR), the rule (Intro) causes a similar effect.
